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School choice in England: evidence from national administrative data  
We study school choice in England using a new dataset containing the choices of all 
parents seeking a school place in state secondary schools. We provide new empirical 
evidence to inform how the school choice market functions, including the number of 
choices made, whether the nearest school is the first choice and the probability of an 
offer from the first choice school. These indicators show that school choice is actively 
used by many households in England. We use the rich data available to describe how 
choices vary by pupil, school and neighbourhood characteristics and how school choice 
is used differently by different groups and in different parts of the country. For the first 
time, we are able to present national data on how the school choices made by parents 
vary according to pupils’ ethnic group and across urban and rural areas. We show, 
contrary to some existing literature that has relied on smaller and less representative 
samples of parents and pupils, that school choices do not vary significantly by social 
background. We show that parents pro-actively use the choice system and present new 
evidence on the extent to which the current school admissions criteria that prioritise 
distance penalise poorer families. Keywords: school admissions; school choice; 
education inequality. 
JEL Code: I24, I28 
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Schools matter and schools differ: educational attainment is key to a child’s life chances, and 
schools vary in their ability to raise attainment. For this reason, the process that a country 
uses to assign its children to schools is important for their subsequent academic achievement 
and their life chances. Since 1988, England has used a system of school choice to do this. 
Parents nominate their preferred schools and, subject to school capacities, a set of published 
criteria are fed into an algorithm to determine the allocation of pupils to schools. This process 
has been standardised across areas and refined over time to prevent covert selection of pupils 
by schools (White et al, 2001; Allen et al, 2012).   
This paper provides new quantitative evidence on the functioning of school choice in 
England, building on a large body of research on school choice that followed the introduction 
of market-based reforms in 1988. We use newly available national data which provides 
information on every household’s secondary school choices for one academic year. The scale 
of this data and the fact that it is a census enables us to provide the most representative 
picture of the school choice market to date. The approach that we take in this paper using 
large scale national data complements a range of qualitative approaches that have been used 
to explore this issue and as such our paper provides novel findings that are, for the first time, 
nationally representative. We build on an important literature on the sociology of school 
choice which has relied on analysis of rich qualitative data from a small sample of 
parents (Ball et al, 1996; Ball and Vincent, 1998; Bagley et al, 2001; Reay and Ball, 1998). 
There is also a literature which has taken a geographical approach, studying specific areas or 
group of areas in depth to account for the local context (Parsons et al, 2000; Taylor, 2000; 
Taylor, 2009). Of course, these different approaches have relative strengths and weaknesses. 
Using national data has the benefit of representativeness but at the expense of detail. We 




contribution of this paper is therefore to provide a nationally representative and 
comprehensive picture of the current working of school choice in England, which will inform 
more detailed future research that can fully account for the local context and explore 
important emerging themes.  
Our two main research questions are, first, to ask to what extent parents actively use 
the school choice system and how use of this system varies across households and 
neighbourhoods. Previous studies have provided information on the school choices made by 
select groups of parents living in particular areas or in specific social circumstances. This 
paper is the first to document the school choices made by parents across the country. We 
have also used the scale of the data to drill down into the school choices made by particular 
sub groups of parents in a variety of different contexts. Second, we ask whether school choice 
is effective. By effective we mean improving education standards for pupils in England by 
enabling pupils to access more highly performing schools and providing meaningful choice 
for parents, in the sense that parents have a number of feasible schools to choose from and 
that they stand a good chance of accessing their preferred schools. The second research 
question is also motivated by the theoretical knowledge that school choice will only improve 
standards in schools overall if parents value academic standards as an important dimension of 
school quality. Determining the extent to which all parents tend to choose schools with higher 
academic standards is therefore an important contribution of the paper. 
The first research question is answered using several indicators of active choice, 
described in turn. 
Do parents choose the closest school, regardless of academic standards? Choosing 
the closest school will dampen the incentives for schools to improve academic standards and 
is therefore a key indicator for the system. Existing evidence is mixed. Following the 1988 




secondary schools in one Local Education Authority, from 33% to 39% between 1991 and 
1996, suggesting increasing use of school choice. The rise was primarily due to choices by 
parents in “struggling” or “aspiring” neighbourhoods rather than those in more prosperous 
neighbourhoods who presumably chose their school in advance through their residential 
choice.  Allen (2007), using an early census of national data, shows that around 50% of 
households attend their closest school, but her study lacked data on households’ choices. 
From the sociology of education perspective, Ball et al (1996) discuss the importance of the 
local school for households defined as “disconnected choosers”, who are constrained by 
“spatial horizons and the practicalities of travel”. In relation to travel time, Taylor (2000) 
finds that 74% of households believe there is a maximum limit of travel time to school, with 
the acceptable limit varying across urban and rural respondents. Note that although an 
important indicator for the working of school choice, choosing the closest school has a 
complicated interpretation. It may suggest a passive engagement with the system, but 
alternatively, may follow an active residential choice or a constrained choice if only the 
closest school is considered feasible by parents.  
Do parents make the minimum or maximum number of choices available? The 
number of choices households make is indicative of how actively the system is used. 
Choosing zero or one school might imply that the school choice system is not properly 
understood or that parents do not have strong preferences. It may also mean that there is only 
one choice that appears feasible to parents. There is little existing evidence on the number of 
choices that households make and the variation in this across areas. As an exception, from a 
sample of 215 parents in 8 schools in the mid-1990s, Taylor (2000) finds that 41% of 
respondents consider only one school. The present  paper is the first to document this 




Is there variation by area and household type? Ball et al (1996) find that choice in 
education is systematically related to social class differences. For example, respondents 
classified as “privileged/skilled choosers” were predominantly from higher social class 
households, while the “disconnected choosers” were predominately from lower social class 
households. This may in part be due to the child’s role in school choice, which in working 
class households has been found to be more influential (Reay and Ball, 1998), although 
Taylor (2000) finds that the child is involved to some extent in 86% of households. There is 
also a literature concerned with patterns of choice across ethnic groups. Weekes-Bernard 
(2007) finds that, in common with the wider population, many Black and Minority Ethnic 
(BME) households were unable to exercise choice, in that their desired school was 
unattainable. From the sample of around 180 parents in three Local Authorities, Weekes-
Bernard finds a preference for Muslim schools for aspirant Muslim parents, which overrides a 
general preference for proximity, particularly among recent immigrants. Studying the impact 
of migration on school choices in Greater Manchester, based on semi-structured interviews 
with 11 migrant parents, Bryne and De Tona (2012) find that there are knowledge barriers to 
school choice, particularly for new migrants, and that ‘grapevine’ knowledge (Ball and 
Vincent, 1988) informed choices rather than published information. A finding common to 
Weekes-Bernard and Bryne and De Tona is that migrant parents search for the ‘right’ social 
and racial mix for their children, which may be distinct from the preferences of White British 
households. The academic environment of the school is particularly important to many 
immigrant families. This is typified by one respondent in the study who expressed agreement 
with a British South Asian journalist that ‘the only thing we can get from this country is 
education, so we have to get that’.  Studying specifically Polish migrants to England and 
Scotland, and based on 25 interviews, Trevena et al (2015) discuss the complicated process of 




For our second research question, regarding the effectiveness of school choice, we 
consider whether parents value the academic standards of schools, which is a critical 
requirement for the market mechanism to improve the quality of education. We also discuss a 
commonly used indicator for the success of school choice, namely whether a household 
achieves its first choice of school.  
Do parents value academic standards in school choice? For school choice to 
operate effectively parents must value academic standards so that schools have an incentive 
to improve. If parents choose without reference to pupil progress this will not provide a 
strong incentive for schools to improve. The qualitative and quantitative approaches are 
broadly consistent in concluding that many parents value academic standards, but this may 
not be the deciding factor. The most commonly cited school characteristics that parents value 
include academic quality, distance between home and school and the social and ethnic 
composition of the school, although there are other factors (Burgess et al. 2015; Gibbons and 
Silva, 2011; Raveaud and Van Zanten, 2007; West and Hind, 2007). For Scotland, Willms & 
Echols (1995) find that parents who make an explicit choice away from their designated 
school did so for “social and reputational factors” as well as the disciplinary climate, while 
the academic quality of the school was of lesser importance, particularly for parents from 
lower socio-economic backgrounds. Similarly, Burgess et al (2011) use information from a 
nationally representative survey of parents in England and find that “proximity” and a 
“general good impression” of the school are most commonly cited reasons, followed by 
academic standards. While most research using parents’ stated preferences has emphasised 
the importance of academic standards, Chakrabarti and Roy (2007) note that this strand of 
literature tends to over-emphasise its importance in relation to research on parents’ revealed 
preferences (their observed choice of school). This may be because parents conform to social 




suggesting that parents’ revealed preferences (which our data set contains) are more 
informative. Alternatively, this inconsistency may be because revealed preferences are 
subject to constraints (for example the expected probability of admission) which would mean 
that preferences for academic standards are not necessarily overstated. Using households’ 
actual choice of school, we show the extent to which choices are correlated with academic 
quality of the school.  
Is achieving the first choice always best?  There is a distinction between a 
household’s first choice and preferred school. For example, Taylor (2000) finds that 91% of 
respondents got their first choice but 17% would have preferred to choose an alternative 
school in the absence of constraints. In a nationally representative later sample, Burgess et al 
(2015) find that 7% of parents would have preferred to choose a different primary school. 
These constraints typically include the lack of places at popular schools, with priority given 
to those living closest. Indeed, Taylor and Gorard (2001) note the “enduring link between 
area of residence and the socioeconomic composition of local schools” as school choice is not 
free of geographical considerations. We discuss the relevance of this indicator of success of 
the system.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a summary of the school choice 
system in England and the resulting incentives for household choices. Section 3 describes the 
new dataset. Section 4 details the results and we offer an overview of the findings and 
broader discussion in section 5. 
  
2. The school choice process in England 
Parents in the English state education system have the right to express a preference for the 




choices of school on a form that is submitted in a centralised system to their Local Authority 
(LA). All government funded schools (regardless of type) use this common application 
system. Private schools are outside this system, although parents can apply to both private 
and state schools simultaneously. On the LA form parents can provide up to 3-6 choices of 
school in rank order, depending on the LA. Most LAs ask parents to list up to 3 schools. A set 
of published school prioritisation criteria are used where a school is over-subscribed. 
Typically, these include: whether the child has a statement of special educational need, is 
looked-after by the local authority, has a sibling at the school already, distance of the family 
home from a school, and less commonly, the faith or aptitude of a child.1 Each child is 
allocated to their highest ranked school where they are admitted according to the criteria of 
each school. If a pupil is not allocated to any preferred school, they are assigned to a school 
with spare capacity (which is by definition less popular). 
The school choice system in England was amended in 2007 to encourage parents to 
choose their truly most preferred schools rather than to make safety-first or strategic choices,2 
although there remains an incentive to list strategic school choices due to the restricted 
number of possible choices. Listing one ‘safe’ school may be advantageous to avoid 
allocation to a school with spare capacity.3 The LA is responsible for school allocations, 
considering parents’ choices and school priorities and published admission numbers. This 
                                                 
1 This is explicitly intended not as a measure of general ability, but a specific aptitude such as music, 
sport or maths for example.  
2 Prior to 2007, different Local Authorities in England used either a first preference first or an equal 
preference allocation mechanism. The first preference first system was outlawed in the 2007 
admissions code since it prioritises students based on the rank order of parents’ choices.  
3 The possibility to list more choices may mitigate this to some extent and allow more ‘ambitious’ 




allocation is done using an algorithm (student optimal stable allocation, see Pathak and 
Sonmez, 2013) that is weakly truth revealing, meaning that parents can do no better than by 
reporting their true preferred schools. The algorithm works by first taking a list of pupils for 
each school, ranked in order of priority, and provisionally assigning pupils to the school they 
ranked most highly where they are ranked within the school’s capacity. Next, these pupils are 
removed from the ranked lists of schools that are less preferred than their provisional 
allocation. Where this creates space at a school, pupils who prefer this school to their 
provisional allocation are reassigned, again according to the original ranking of pupils. This 
process is repeated until all pupils are assigned to their most preferred school subject to the 
schools’ admission arrangements. This may not be fully understood by parents however, who 
may believe that they are more likely to be allocated their most preferred school by only 
making one choice, or that they will be penalised for entry to their second-choice school by 
making an ‘ambitious’ first choice. 
The School Admissions Code defines acceptable over-subscription criteria for 
schools.4 More autonomous types of schools (now around 62% of all secondary schools) 
determine their own admissions criteria within the School Admissions Code. An interview 
with a parent, for example, is not an acceptable criterion. If a child is refused a place at a 
school, there is the right of appeal to an independent panel. In 2015/16 the percentage of 
                                                 






admissions resulting in an appeal was 3.7%, of which around one fifth found in favour of the 
parent(s).5 
Parents can also devise strategies to maximise their chances of getting into their 
preferred school, for example by choosing a nearby home. Parents may therefore appear to 
value school proximity highly, but in fact the distance between home and school is driven by 
the admissions criteria. The higher demand for homes close to popular schools has been 
studied empirically and is acknowledged to increase house prices around ‘good’ schools 
(Barrow, 2002; Bayer et al, 2007; Black, 1999; Fack and Grenet, 2010; Gibbons et al, 2013; 
Gibbons and Machin, 2003; Kane et al. 2006; Machin and Salvanes, 2016).  
 
3. Data 
We use globally unique administrative data on parents’ school choices. Most school choice 
analyses use either partial information on choices or full data from a particular locality or 
city. Unusually, our data covers the whole cohort of pupils who sought admission to any 
English state secondary school in the school year 2014/15. The parental choice data contain 
for each pupil: the ID of each nominated school (e.g. first, second and third choices in some 
areas and up to 6 choices in others), and the identity of the school that the child was offered, 
which may differ from the school that the pupil was finally enrolled in. Our dataset also links 
to the National Pupil Dataset (NPD), a census of all pupils in the English education system. 
Students whose families made a choice but don’t enter the state-sector are included in the 
data. Access to these data was provided by the Department for Education, through the NPD 
                                                 






application process.6  
The two datasets together provide us with: the characteristics of pupils and the 
detailed characteristics of all the schools they applied to (not just the one they enrol in), and 
their home location in relation to all their preferred schools and to their allocated school.7 The 
sample is large (over 526k pupils) which permits fine-grained analysis. We analyse the whole 
cohort with only a few exceptions. We exclude middle school areas as there are two school 
moves rather than one. We include selective areas in which students must pass an 
examination to get into some schools (grammar schools). We compare LAs where more than 
three or only three school choices are allowed, and areas with higher and lower numbers of 
schools in the local area as a measure of population and school density.  
For pupil characteristics, we focus on eligibility for Free School Meals (FSM), as a 
marker of poverty, and aggregate ethnic groups.8 We also consider whether a pupil has 
English as an Additional Language (EAL), and IDACI as a measure of neighbourhood 
deprivation.9 Detailed definitions for variable creation are in Appendix 1. Appendix Table 1 
shows the sample size for each subgroup. 
There are limitations to the data. We do not know the precise admissions criteria for 
each school. While these criteria almost always involve similar rules, as we discussed above, 
there will be local variation in detail that may be decisive for some schools and pupils.  
                                                 
6 The authors are happy to provide further details and original application forms on request but note 
that the NPD application process was reformed in June 2018 as so these are less relevant. 
7 The family’s postcode is taken from the NPD – at the closest point to when the choice was made. If 
this is not available, the postcode recorded in secondary school is used.  
8 Ethnic group is derived from the National Pupil Database, based on minor ethnic group 
classification.  




The most important limitation is that we do not know the nature of the priority of each 
pupil for each of their school choices.10 In particular, we do not know whether the child has 
an older sibling at the school or whether the child is a ‘Looked After Child’, both of which 
have high priority in over-subscribed schools, generally overriding proximity. Not having this 
information complicates the analysis of parents’ choices. If having an older sibling was 
evenly distributed through the cohort then this problem should not bias our analyses, but this 
is unlikely to hold. In the Millennium Cohort Study, the presence of an older sibling of 
secondary school age is strongly correlated with household income: 67% of children in the 
lowest income decile have an older sibling of school age at the point relevant for school 
admission, compared to 33% in the highest income decile. Priority to a preferred school 
(which we do not observe) may therefore be correlated with household characteristics such as 
eligibility for free school meals. This point needs to be borne in mind when considering the 
results.  
4. Results 
We present results relating to our two research questions exploring the functioning and the 
effectiveness of school choice. For the first research question, regarding the extent and 
variation in active school choice, we present and discuss the following key indicators: the 
number of choices made by households, whether the first-choice school is the nearest, and 
variation by household and neighbourhood type. For the second research question, we 
explore whether households value the academic standards of a school (with the implication 
that if they do, this is likely to lead to higher standards in England’s schools), whether school 
places reflect parents’ preferences and the likelihood of receiving an offer from a first choice 
                                                 
10 This information was used for example by Allen, Burgess and McKenna (2013) in modelling the 




school. We also interpret this measure of success of the system. To explore the variation 
across households, results in all tables are shown separately by personal characteristics: FSM, 
ethnicity, EAL status and neighbourhood poverty level. We also show neighbourhood 
characteristics based on where the family making the choices lives: the number of choices 
families can make, and density. We postpone a broad discussion of the findings to the final 
section of the paper.  
Active use and understanding of school choice 
a) Number of choices made 
Table 1 shows the number of school choices made on the LA form. The overall average 
number of choices made is 2.4, but there is wide dispersion. 35% of households make only 
one choice, while at the other extreme, 27% make the maximum number of choices 
permitted.  There is very little difference between the number of choices made by richer and 
poorer households. Similar proportions of FSM and non-FSM households make only 1 choice 
and indeed similar proportions make the maximum number of choices. There are much 
bigger differences by ethnicity and EAL status however. For example, 41% of White British 
households only make 1 choice, compared to 17% of Asian households and 12% of Black 
households. At the other extreme, 37% of these latter groups make as many choices as they 
can, compared to 24% of White British households. These differences are reflected in the 
split by EAL status, with a much higher fraction of EAL households making all choices 
possible and a higher mean number of choices.  
There are striking differences across neighbourhood characteristics. People make 
more choices in dense neighbourhoods (represented by the number of schools within 20km), 
with far fewer making just one choice. In Hackney in central London for example only 9% of 
people make just one choice, while 27% make the maximum allowable six choices. Similarly, 




in Cornwall, 77% of parents make just one choice. Online Appendix Table 1 shows the 
number of choices made in each LA in England. Second, the maximum number of choices 
allowed is correlated with the number of choices made. Almost twice as many choices are 
made in LAs where more choices are allowed, on average. This is partly related to population 
density, as urban areas are more likely to allow more than three choices, 11 but there is 
evidence of a frustrated demand to make more choices for some parents, particularly in urban 
areas where only three choices are permitted. For example, shown in Online Appendix Table 
1, 71% of parents make the maximum number of three school choices in Brighton and Hove 
and presumably given the option, many parents would have made more choices.  
Finally, there are relatively slight differences in the number of choices made by 
neighbourhood poverty, the mean number of choices made being slightly higher in poorer 
areas.  
Of course, many of these factors are strongly correlated, for example urban density 
with neighbourhood poverty. We run a simple multivariate regression to control for these 
factors simultaneously (Appendix Table 2). Columns 1 to 4 confirm the points made above 
from the raw data in Table 1 are confirmed by regression analysis. 
b) First-choice school is the nearest school 
Table 2 shows the percentage of households that nominate the nearest school as their first 
choice. Strikingly, this percentage is only 39%. These households appear to value proximity 
highly, but some will have moved home precisely to make their preferred school their nearest 
school. Around 3.5% of households in the Millennium Cohort Study report moving to a new 
                                                 
11 In most areas of the country households can make a maximum of three choices. Exceptions are London (Pan-
London co-ordinated admissions) and the surrounding area, Manchester and surrounding LAs, and Birmingham 




house to ensure the child is admitted to their preferred school but many more are likely to 
have considered local school quality in their choice of home. Even if we widen the definition 
to ask, ‘is the nominated first-choice school within 20% distance of the nearest one’, that is 
still only true for less than half of all families. This implies that most families do not prioritise 
distance from the school above all else.  
There are important differences in this statistic by area characteristics. Unsurprisingly, 
households in less dense areas, with fewer schools and longer commute times, are more likely 
to choose their nearest school. Households in areas where more choices are allowed are also 
less likely to pick the nearest (though as London is the largest area with more than three 
choices, this fact may drive this relationship). There appears to be a degree of caution being 
exhibited whereby parents are more likely to put down the school that they have the greatest 
chance of their child being admitted to (often their nearest) when they are only permitted 3 
choices. Households living in more affluent neighbourhoods are more likely to choose their 
closest school, which may reflect the overall quality of schools there rather than preferences 
for distance.  
The differences across sub-groups of families reflect the patterns seen for the number 
of choices made. There is essentially no difference in the proportion of families choosing 
their nearest school by FSM-eligibility, 38% versus 39%. By contrast, there are substantial 
differences by EAL-status and by ethnicity. On the former, 42% of non-EAL pupils put the 
nearest school top of their list, compared to 27% of EAL pupils.  
There is a marked decline in the proportion nominating their closest school by the 
number of choices made. Only 20% of those making at least four choices nominate the 
nearest, and even among those that make one choice, only 55% nominate their closest school. 
This suggests that proximity is not the most important consideration even for those who make 




Appendix Table 2 (columns 5 and 6) confirm that these observed patterns are evident 
when accounting for other factors in a multivariate regression. As such, the finding that 
ethnic minority pupils are less likely to choose their closest school, for example, is true 
conditional on population density.   
Online Appendix Table 2 extends the definition to whether any of the schools that 
families nominated were the nearest. Even then, the overall figure is just 55% - almost half of 
all families do not nominate their nearest school at all.  
Effectiveness of school choice 
a) Value of academic standards 
Figure 1 shows the likelihood that a family nominates their nearest school as first 
choice relative to the academic attainment of that school. Households whose closest school is 
in the lowest quartile of attainment are least likely to choose their closest school. The 
proportion nominating their closest school as first-choice school declines with the number of 
nearby schools, irrespective of the closest schools’ attainment. Less than 15% of households 
in very dense urban areas whose nearest school is in the bottom quartile of attainment 
nominate that school as top choice. We note that higher academic attainment does not 
necessarily indicate a higher quality of teaching at the school, as academic attainment is also 
a function of the peer group at the school. It is, however, a commonly used metric for parents.   
Are there limits to parents choosing highly attaining schools? One such limit is the 
number of choices that parents can make, which is binding for many households in some, 
particularly urban, areas. This means that the first choice school may be “safe” rather than 
“ambitious”. The data show that the quality of parents’ first choice school is higher in LAs 
where more choices are permitted (which is true even taking account of higher school quality 
in London). These results are reported in a summary regression in Appendix Table 2, 




regressions. This indicates that where parents are given a greater number of choices they use 
it to make ambitious choices.12  
Figure 2 shows that, on average, academic attainment is highest for the first choice 
school and declines with later choices, whether the households make 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 choices. 
For example, in London, for households that make 6 choices, the first choice has 71% of 
students achieving 5A*-C, compared with 70% for the second choice. This declines for each 
choice, to 63% for the sixth choice. In LAs where three choices are permitted, for those 
making the maximum number of choices, the first choice school has 62% of students 
achieving 5A*-C, compared with 59% for the second choice and 57% for the third choice. On 
average, the most preferred schools have higher academic attainment than lower choices, 
which is consistent with households valuing this attribute.  
b) Admission to first-choice school 
Table 3 reports the fraction of households that are observed in their first-choice school in the 
Spring term after school entry. This is slightly different to the fraction receiving an offer from 
their first-choice school, suggesting some offers are not taken up, some individuals get put on 
waiting lists and then secure a place at their school of choice, and some successfully appeal 
decisions. We focus on the receipt of an offer but note any interesting discrepancies.  
The overall fraction of households receiving an offer from their first-choice school is 
85%. That most parents get their first choice of school suggests, at face value, that the system 
                                                 
12 This simple regression suggests that for households eligible for free school meals there is not a 
significant positive relationship between the quality of first choice school and number of choices 
permitted. This suggests that increasing the number of choices would not necessarily reduce 





is effective. With a restricted choice list there is a distinction between the first choice and 
preferred school, however, as households may make pragmatic choices based on the 
probability of admission at each school. This 85% may therefore be viewed more negatively 
as reflecting constraints on households’ choices. A successful system with active and 
ambitious choices by parents may result in a lower percentage of households achieving their 
first choice.  
There is little difference between FSM and non-FSM families, with respectively 84% 
and 86% being successful. Comparing offers and attendance, for FSM pupils 81% attend 
their first-choice school, compared to 84% who received an offer, whereas is reversed for 
non-FSM pupils - more attend their first choice than receive an initial offer, perhaps due to 
successful appeals. 
Differences are larger between ethnic groups and by EAL status. Black and Asian 
households are less likely to have an offer from their first-choice school than White British 
households; similarly, EAL households are less likely to have an offer from their first choice 
(73% relative to 88%).  
There are also significant differences between types of area. In densely populated 
urban areas (with an above median number of schools within 20km) applicants have a lower 
probability of receiving an offer from their first-choice school. This may reflect a wider 
variation in school quality, more schools within a feasible travel distance, more competition 
for places at popular schools and parents being less able to predict the demand for each 
school. 
Households in LAs where only three choices are allowed are also more likely to 
receive an offer from their first choice. This may be because these LAs are typically more 
rural or that households are more cautious when choices are limited. The number of choices 




choice. 97% of households that make only one choice receive an offer from this school. This 
suggests that their offer was almost guaranteed, perhaps due to proximity or strong priority 
due to a sibling or other characteristic. For those making the maximum number of choices, 
77% received an offer from their first-choice school. This may be because those with a low 
probability of admission make more choices, or because more sophisticated users of the 
system make all the choices they can, including an ambitious nomination as first choice.  
Overall, Table 3 shows that pupils have a lower chance of getting an offer from their 
first-choice school if: they live in dense urban areas; they live in areas where more choices 
are permitted; they live in poorer neighbourhoods; they apply to high performing schools; or 
they are from minority ethnic backgrounds. The largest differences arise from density, school 
quality and the maximum number of choices permitted. Of course, all these factors are 
correlated. Because of the importance of population density in affecting the outcome, 
Appendix Table 2 (columns 7 to 10) report the results from a multivariate regression 
(including the number of schools within 20km as a proxy for population density together with 
other variables). The key points we make above are confirmed.  
Should we therefore conclude that school choice is less effective in these urban areas 
and for ethnic minority households? The key indicator of interest is the percentage of 
households offered a place at their most preferred school, with a more effective system 
increasing this percentage. As the most preferred school may not necessarily equate to the 
first choice school it is not possible to conclude whether school choice is more effective in 
particular areas or for particular households. Indeed, as we have argued, ambitious school 
choices to a preferred school (which should be encouraged) would result in a lower 





5. Discussion and Conclusions 
The school a pupil attends can affect their attainment and enjoyment of school, ultimately 
affecting their life chances. Understanding the functioning of the school choice system and 
how pupils are allocated to schools is therefore critical if we are to understand and improve 
educational equality and social mobility. In this paper we use a novel and comprehensive 
dataset to study the how school choice works across England.  
Our analysis shows that a large proportion of parents use the school choice system 
pro-actively. Previous studies have explored the process of school choice for relatively small 
samples of parents. Our contribution is to document nationally the extent and variation in 
active school choices across household and neighbourhood types. We find that significant 
numbers of parents make the maximum number of school choices. Further, contrary to some 
existing literature, only a minority of parents choose their nearest school. The local school is 
more likely to be bypassed where its academic quality is low: this holds for different types of 
parents, including poorer parents. In other words, the data suggest that many parents are 
making active choices for schools and appear to value academic attainment.  
Further, with our novel data we are able to present large scale quantitative evidence 
on the extent of strategic choices being made by parents. We show that many parents do 
make strategic choices, which implies that they understand the school choice system as it 
currently operates. We show, for the first time, that when parents make multiple choices, their 
first choice tends to be more ambitious. We are also able to consider the constraints imposed 
by the school choice system in some areas. People make more cautious choices when 
constrained to 3 options. This suggests that they would have benefited from having more 
choices, consistent with theoretical and experimental evidence (Calsamiglia et al, 2010; 
Haeringer & Klijn, 2009), and an important note for policy. Our findings provide system 




a preferred school simply by offering parents the option of making more choices on the 
application form. This would be relatively costless and would reduce the need for a strategic 
or ‘safe’ school choice. 
While some households clearly engage with the school choice process, which may act 
to improve standards, choice is curtailed for others by the predominant current school 
admissions criteria. Allocating places to over-subscribed schools by proximity means that 
some households have negligible chance of admission to the best schools. Given the limited 
choices permitted, these households may decide that making such an ‘ambitious’ choice 
would be wasteful. Goldharber (2000) states that “the rules in place governing the structure 
of any particular school choice program are likely crucial in determining the outcomes of the 
program.” In England, the dominant over-subscription criteria for secondary schools, straight 
line distance, is likely to induce strategic school choices, residential segregation and unequal 
access to the highest quality schools. 
Much of the previous literature on school choice has suggested that richer and poorer 
parents make different school choices. This indeed has been a key argument against the 
system of school choice, suggesting that it may disadvantage children from poorer 
backgrounds. The evidence on this issue however, has largely been gleaned from smaller 
scale studies. Our national data shows that in fact FSM and non-FSM households are similar 
in terms of the number of choices made, the proximity of first-choice, and admission to first 
choice school. Poorer parents appear to make as active use of the school choice system as 
richer parents. However, non-FSM households still access better schools due to their 
proximity to higher performing schools. In London, students registered for FSM attend a 
school where 59% of pupils achieve 5A*-C grades at GCSE, on average, compared to 65% 




policy issue is to consider different admissions criteria that might reduce this inequality in 
access.  
There is also a striking difference between White and Black and Asian families (and 
relatedly between EAL and non-EAL families). Black or Asian families (or EAL families) 
make far more school choices and prefer higher performing schools. This is consistent with 
previous research suggesting the high value of education for aspirant ethnic minorities and 
immigrants. Building on this research, we are the first to show evidence that these differences 
in values may lead to varying engagement with school choice. Without more in-depth study 
we cannot conclusively say what drives these differences, which is a subject for future 
research. For example, this could be explored by comparing households that are newly 
observed in the national data with less recent migrants. Perhaps the former have a greater 
focus on education or a better understanding of the school choice system. The trade-off made 
between academic quality and choosing the ‘right’ social and ethnic mix should also be the 
subject of future work, which will inform important policy conclusions about ethnic 
segregation. Indeed, the data used in this research could complement the qualitative literature 
that finds strong preferences for particular peer groups. 
Our conclusion is therefore that the school choice system is being actively used. 
However, the national picture suggests that this is true to varying extents in different 
contexts, more so in urban areas than in rural areas and more so by Black, Asian and EAL 
students. Certainly, only a minority of families make just one choice or choose their local 
school. Further, taken at face value the system appears to be working well. Most parents get 
their first choice of school. However, given that most schools are at capacity, this finding 
may equally reflect a degree of realism in parents’ assessments of admission and constraints 
to their choice. The next step for the research agenda is to determine the relative importance 




school) in school allocation. In subsequent papers we intend to undertake further statistical 
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 Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Number of choices made (secondary) 
 1 (%) 2 (%) 3 (%) 4+ (%) Max (%) Mean 
All 34.55 21.58 26.89 16.98 26.88 2.41 
Pupil characteristics 
FSM 36.86 20.49 25.98 16.67 24.31 2.39 
Non-FSM 34.15 21.77 27.05 17.03 27.32 2.42 
EAL 18.62 16.66 29.81 34.91 34.25 3.20 
Non-EAL 38.15 22.69 26.23 12.93 25.22 2.24 
White British 40.78 23.52 25.94 9.76 24.03 2.10 
Asian 17.06 16.51 31.45 34.97 37.79 3.24 
Black 11.84 13.13 26.96 48.07 37.12 3.69 
Above median SES 
(neighbourhood) 37.72 22.89 25.94 13.45 25.67 2.24 
Below median SES 
(neighbourhood) 31.49 20.28 27.81 20.43 28.04 2.58 
Local area characteristics 
Above median 
number of schools 
within 20km 25.55 19.93 26.67 27.85 26.88 2.85 
Below median 
number of schools 
within 20km 43.73 23.26 27.11 5.89 26.88 1.97 
3 choices allowed 44.61 23.62 31.64 0.14 31.78 1.87 
More than 3 choices 
allowed 23.43 19.32 21.64 35.61 21.46 3.01 
Note: Overall sample size is 526,329. ‘FSM’ denotes free school meals, a binary indicator for pupil 
income disadvantage. ‘EAL’ denotes English as an additional language. ‘Above median SES 
(neighbourhood)’ denotes neighbourhood disadvantage (defined by the Income Deprivation 
Affecting Children Index) is the more affluent half in the sample. ‘Above median number of 
schools within 20km’ denotes the number of schools within 20km above the median in the 
sample. ‘3 choices allowed’ denotes the maximum number of choices parents are able to express 
is 3.   
Source: National Pupil Database linked to national parents’ preferences data, made available by the 





Table 2 Admission to first choice school 
 % with offer to first 
choice 
% attend first choice 
All 85.36 85.21 
Pupil characteristics   
FSM 84.13 80.64 
Non-FSM 85.57 86.01 
EAL 72.80 72.97 
Non-EAL 88.17 87.91 
White British 90.26 89.75 
Asian 72.12 73.58 
Black 66.34 66.22 
Above median SES 
(neighbourhood) 88.68 89.36 
Below median SES 
(neighbourhood) 82.23 81.08 
One choice 97.05 95.31 
Two choices 87.31 86.42 
Three choices 81.16 81.66 
At least four choices 65.54 68.28 
Maximum number of 
choices 77.00 78.17 
Local area characteristics   
Above median number of 
schools within 20km 80.07 80.55 
Below median number of 
schools within 20km 90.72 89.90 
3 choices allowed 91.38 90.24 
More than 3 choices 
allowed 78.65 79.58 





Table 3 First choice school is closest school 
 % First choice is 
closest school 




% First choice is 
closest school in 
LA 
All 38.98 45.95 39.56 
Pupil characteristics   
FSM 38.03 45.03 38.60 
Non-FSM 39.15 46.11 39.73 
EAL 27.28 33.47 27.57 
Non-EAL 41.63 48.77 42.28 
White British 43.90 51.28 44.59 
Asian 27.73 34.39 27.88 
Black 18.85 23.51 19.23 
Above median SES 
(neighbourhood) 43.73 51.07 44.47 
Below median SES 
(neighbourhood) 34.35 40.95 34.78 
One choice 55.43 62.89 56.53 
Two choices 37.59 45.25 38.09 
Three choices 31.03 37.88 31.30 
At least four choices 19.88 25.15 20.01 
Maximum number of 
choices 28.01 34.43 28.17 
Local area characteristics 
Above median number 
of schools within 20km 31.66 37.98 32.36 
Below median number 
of schools within 20km 46.43 54.05 46.89 
3 choices allowed 45.54 52.95 46.23 
More than 3 choices 
allowed 31.73 38.20 32.18 





Figure 1: First choice is closest school, by number of schools within 20km (vigintiles) and 
school quality of closest school (measured by % 5A*-C) in quartiles 
 






Figure 2: Academic attainment (measured by % 5A*-C) of school choices, by the number of 
choices made 
 
Note: The bars show the %5A*-C (including English and maths) for each choice (1 to 6), by the 
number of choices made (where “1 ch.” denotes “1 choice” and so on).   







Appendix Table 1: Sample size by pupil and local area characteristics 









White British 369,635 
Asian 56,209 
Black 29,547 
Above median SES (neighbourhood) 260,260 
Below median SES (neighbourhood) 260,256 
Local area characteristics 
 
 
Above median number of schools within 20km 264,598 
Below median number of schools within 20km 259,517 
3 choices allowed 275,225 
More than 3 choices allowed 248,735 






 Appendix Table 2: Regression estimates 
 One school choice Maximum number of 
choices 
First-choice school is closest 
school 
Attend first choice school Offer from first choice school Quality of first choice 
school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
FSM 0.06*** 0.06*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** -0.02*** 0.03** -0.01*** -0.01** -4.68*** -4.60*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.30) 
EAL -0.02*** -0.12*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 -0.08*** -0.02* -0.10*** -0.01* -0.11*** -1.62*** 3.09*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.31) (0.44) 
Asian -0.15***  0.17***  -0.11***  -0.10***  -0.13***  7.16***  
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.53)  
Black -0.20***  0.19***  -0.18***  -0.17***  -0.18***  5.86***  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.59)  
Below median SES 
(neighbourhood) 
0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -7.92*** -7.55*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.34) 
Above median 
number of schools 
within 20km 










(0.01) (0.47) (0.47) 
More than 3 choices 
allowed 
-0.13*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.07* -0.08* -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.09*** 1.79** 2.23*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.56) (0.55) 
School quality in 
local area 
          0.35*** 0.35*** 
          (0.02) (0.02) 
Ethnic group 
included 
Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N 
Number of 
observations 520,499 520,499 520,499 520,499 515,662 515,662 516,871 516,871 504,583 504,598 458,510 458,510 






Appendix Figure 1: Maximum number of choices possible 
 
Note: Borders shown are local authority (LA) boundaries.  
Source: See Table 1.  
 
